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THE PREFERENCE REVERSAL PHENOMENON:
RESPONSE MODE, MARKKIS AND INCENTIVES
By James C. Cox and David M. Grether* 
The preference reversal phenomenon has been a subject of research for over two decades. First discovered 
by psychologists (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971,  1973; Lindman, 1971), it has been 
studied by economists beginning with Grether and Plott (1979), (see Cox and Epstein ( 1 989) and references !here). 
In addition to replication of lhe phenomenon, !here have been several attempts to explain it (Holt, 1 986; Loomes and 
Sugden, 1 983; Loomes, Stanncr and Sugden, 1 989, 1 99 1 ;  Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Kami and Safra, 1987; Segal, 
1988; Schkade and Johnson, 1989). 
In preference reversal experiments, subjects arc asked to choose between two lotteries in each of several 
pairs of binary lotteries. One lottery (or "gamble" or "bet") in a pair typically has a high probability of winning a 
small amount of money; this is Ll1c probability bet or "P bet." The other, riskier lollery in the pair has a smaller 
chance of winning a larger amount of money; this is the dollar bet or "S bet." In addition to choosing between the 
gambles, subjects are asked to place monetary values on them. The valuation (or judgement) question has been 
asked in many ways; the most common procedure has been to elicit selling prices using the procedure introduced 
by Becker, De Groot, and Marshak (1964).1 
A preference reversal occurs when the preference revealed by choice is the reverse of the preference 
revealed by valuation, i.e. when the chosen bet is given a lower valuation Lhan the other bet. In most previous 
experiments, observed preference reversals have been asy1n1nelric: subjects have frequently chosen the P bet and 
assigned the higher price to the S bet, but rarely have they chosen the $ bet and placed a higher value on the P bet 
(however, see Casey, 1 99 1 ,  for a notable exception). 
The preference reversal phenomenon violates the consistency properties of economic lheories of decision 
making under uncertainty. Asymmetry of observed reversals is even more problematic for economics lhan is 
symmetric inconsistency. The reason is that sy1n1netric inconsistency could be interpreted as resulting from mistakes 
or could be accommodated by introducing an unbiased random element into choices. In contrast, asymmetric 
preference reversals provide support for psychological theories Lhat lhe choice response mode can elicit different 
preferences than the valuation response mode. Dependence of revealed preferences on the response mode could pose 
a serious challenge to the usefulness of accepted economic models as a positive theory of market behavior if the 
phenomenon is robust to 1narkct choices and valuations. 
Preference reversals and other anomalies observed in individual choice experiments clearly have implications 
for economics (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1 983). Preference reversals are one of several types of systematic violations 
of expected utility theory that are commonly observed in individual choice experiments (see Machina, 1987, and 
Camerer, 1989, for surveys). Observations from individual choice experiments imply that people making 
nonrepetitive choices and judgements in nonmarket contexts frequently violate expected utility theory (Grether and 
Plott, 1979) and its generalizations (Cox and Epstein, 1989). Preference reversals and other anomalies may imply 
that accepted economic models are fundamentally flawed as a positive theory of market behavior. There is, however, 
a large literature on market experiments that has found results that are generally consistent with the market allocation 
implications of rational choice theory (Plott, 1987; Smith, 1982b, 1 986; Cox, Smith and Walker, 1988).' 
In the present paper, we extend the study of preference reversals to market environments and begin to 
address the apparent conflict between the experimenutl literature on individual choice and judgement and the 
literature focused on market experiments. We present the results of a series of experiments designed to analyze: (i) 
the effects of economic incentives, repetition, feedback, and information on decisions in market environments; and 
(ii) the effects of different response modes on decisions in paired nonmarket and market environments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I contains an explanation of the research questions. The 
experimental design is presented in Section II. Section III contains a description of the experimental procedures, 
and the results of analyses of the data are given in Section IV. Section V contains the summary conclusions. 
I. Issues
A .  Markets vs. Individual Experiments 
The first topic to be addressed is the apparent conflict between the results of experiinents focusing on 
individual behavior and of those dealing with inarkets. The experi1nental literature seems to us to establish the 
following: individual behavior is in some situations inconsistent with expected utility theory in ways that are 
systematic and replicable. In addition, individual beliefs about probabilities are often poorly calibrated and do not 
obey the rules of the probability calculus (Allais, 1953; Beach and Wisc, 1969; Beach, ct al., 1970; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Fischhoff, 1975; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982, and Grether, 1980). On the other hand, the results from 
market experiments generally are reported to be consistent with economic theory. The predictions verified are often 
from models which include the assumption that agents arc expected utility maximizers whose subjective 
probabilities are objectively correct and internally consistent (Plott, Miller and Smith, 1977; Forsythe, Palfrey and 
Plott, 1982; Plott and Sunder, 1982; Cox, Smith and Walker, 1988; Forsythe, ct al., 1991; Camerer, 1992). Like all 
generalizations, the one we have just stated has exceptions (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Isaac and Plott, 1981; Plott and 
Sunder, 1988; Gigerenzcr 1991). One of the few researchers to study tlie biases observed in individual experiments 
in market settings is Camerer (1987, 1989). He found biases in markets which were in the direction predicted from 
individual experiments but of small 1nagnitudcs. �fhe cfTccts of arbitrage on preference reversals in marketlike 
experiments have been studied by Berg, et al. (1985) and by Chu and Chu (1990). 
There are several reasons why phenomena such as preference reversals that are robust observations in 
individual choice experiments n1ay not be robust in 1narkcl cxpcrin1cnts. 
1. Feedback. Individual decision experiments differ greatly in the feedback subjects receive during the experiments.
In some experiments, subjects learn the results or their decisions immediately, while in others they are only informed 
about a subset or their decisions at the end of the experiment. In contrast, in market experiments subjects are almost 
always informed at once of the consequences of their actions. 
2. Repetition. Market experiments usually involve repetition; often there are multiple periods, each with identical
parameters. Experin1ents \vhich do not literally repeat the saine environn1ents still require subjects to perform a 
series of similar tasks (submitting bids, 1naking offers, etc). Individual choice and decision experiments are more 
varied in this regard. In so1ne cases, subjects are n1ade to repeat the sa1ne task several tiines and in other cases each 
task is done once. These com1nents are not necessarily intended as criticis1n of soine experiments focusing on 
individual behavior; in many cases repetition could be inappropriate, possibly leading subjects to view their task as 
a consistency test. 
3. Psychologically different tasks. It may be that behavior in market environments is different from behavior in
individual decision making settings. It is possible that pulling people into market environments causes them to act 
differently. The presence of other active participants whose behavior influences their rewards may cause people to 
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behave in a more strategic manner. Also, speculation about what actions others xnay take 1nay lead to a different 
analysis of the situation and affect the actions taken. 
4. Institutions. Market institutions may be robust. We know that the standard textbook conditions of perfect
competition are not necessary to attain competitive outcomes in market experiments (Smith, 1982a). It may be that 
some market institutions can achieve efficient allocations even with traders that cotnmit preference reversals and 
other anomalies in individual choice experiments. 
5. Jnfor1nation. Markets generate infonnation of many types that are not available from individual decision making
environments. Individual parameters and actions 'ffe aggregated to produce market prices, sales volumes, etc. 
Depending upon the institution and the trading rules, participants may also see the bids, offers, and transactions of 
other agents. 
6. Economic incentives. Most econo1nists use financial incentives in their experi1nents while psychologists do so
some of the time. There does not appear to be a consensus in psychology on the usefulness of monetary incentives 
(see, for example, Wright and Abdoul-Ezz, 1988; Scott, Jr., cl al., 1988; Irwin et al., 1992). Furthermore, when 
psychologists do use monetary incentives, their payoffs are often much lower than those typically used by 
economists. For example, the expected salient payoffs in the Tversky et al. (1990) nonhypotheticaJ preference 
reversal experiments were a small fraction of those in the Cox-Epstein (1989) experiments. One can argue about 
the appropriate level of payoffs, and about the costs to the subjects of deviating from "optimal" behavior in particular 
experiments, but the fact is that the effect of economic incentives is an empirical question that can only be addressed 
with empirical methods. However, the use of "nontrivial" financial incentives is probably necessary if economists 
are going to take the results seriously, especially if the experiments involve markets. But the level of payoff that 
is "nontrivial" is, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder. Therefore, in our experiments we vary the level of 
individual subjects' salient re\vards from zero to full dollar value. 
B. Response Mode 
Psychologists have theories about ho\v the response 1node affects subjects' decisions, and some of these 
theories have been used to explain the preference re.versa! phenomenon. For example, Slavic and Lichtenstein (1983) 
used the "anchoring and adjustment" theory to explain preference reversals. According to this theory, a subject when 
asked to choose between two lotteries lirst anchors on the relative probabilities of winning and then makes an 
insufficient adjustment for differences in win suite payoffs. Furthermore, a subject when asked to choose selling 
prices, is said to first anchor on the relative win state payoffs and then make an insufficient adjustment for 
differences in the probability of winning. This theory explained the asymmetric pattern of inconsistencies between 
choices and prices that was observed in many preference reversal experiments; subjects more commonly (a) placed 
a higher price on a$ bet and chose the paired P bet (committed a "predicted reversal") than they (b) placed a higher 
price on the P bet and chose the paired S bet (committed an "unpredicted reversal"). 
A recent response mode explanation of preference reversals has been provided by Bostic, Hernnstein, and 
Luce (1990). They present evidence that the difference between the choice task and the judgement (i.e. pricing) task 
is a key factor in explaining the results of preference reversal cxperin1ents. In their experi1nents, certainty equivalents 
to the gambles 'ffe elicited in two different ways. One procedure, a variant of that used in Grether and Plott (1979), 
required subjects to state the amount of money such that they were indifferent between it and the gamble. In the 
other procedure, subjects were asked to give their preference between the gamble and a fixed sum of money. If 
the subject preferred the gamble (money), the amount of money was increased (decreased) by $.04 and the question 
repeated. The procedure was iterated until the preference changed. Bostic, et al. report that the frequency of 
preference reversals dropped substantially when the second procedure was used and that the asymmetry between 
the nu1nber of predicted and unpredicted reversals was eliininated. 
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Tversky, Slavic, and Kahncman (1990) also studied preference reversals using pairwise choices. They 
asked subjects to state their most preferred item from each of three pairs: { P  bet,$ bet}, { P  bet, $X} and {$bet, 
$X}, where $X is a fixed amount of money. Jn addition lo eliciting choices between P bets and $ bets for 
comp<:uison with relative prices, these choice questions can directly reveal intransitivitics. The pricing task used by 
Tversky, et al. is a variant of the ordinal pricing approach used by Cox and Epstein (1989) to avoid using procedures 
under which preference reversals can be attributed to failure of the independence or compound lottery axioms (Kami 
and Safra, 1987; Segal, 1988). For those bet pairs with SX between the ordinal prices, Tversky, et al. found that 
the rate of intransitivity was only about ten percent, substantially less than the reversal rate observed using the 
ordinal prices. They concluded that this showed that preference reversals were caused by a failure of "procedure 
invariance" rather than by intransitive preferences. The certainty equivalents used by Tversky et al. did not bracket 
$X in about 50 percent of the cases so that the test was inconclusive for those cases. Furthermore, it is not known 
that the 50 percent of the cases thus excluded are an unbiased sample of responses with respect to the incidence of 
preference reversals, intransitivities, etc. When ordinal prices were obtained subjects knew that if they played one 
of the bets it would either be one they chose or the one on which they placed the higher price. Most of the 
experiments involved hypothetical choices. Some of the experiments did include some groups that were paid salient 
monetary rewards. For example, 15 percent of the subjects in one group in Study 1 were randomly selected for 
payment. Then one of their several decisions was randomly selected for payment. These two procedures imbed the 
decisions in a compound lottery with low compounded win state probabilities for all (both P and$) bets. The lottery
is the same, however, whether induced by choice or by pricing. 
Cox and Epstein (l 989) avoided the problems of low compounded win state probabilities for bets and 
involvement of the independence axiom (Holl, 19 86) by paying their subjects after each decision. This raised the 
possibility that choices could have been affected by subject earnings during the experiment (wealth effects), but Cox 
and Epstein controlled for earnings in their statislical analysis and found virtually no such effects. Cox and Epstein 
observed 30-35 percent preference reversal rates but they did not observe the asy1n1nctry in types of reversals 
observed by Tversky, ct al. and by earlier researchers who used the Becker - De Groot - Marshak (BDM, 1964) 
mechanism (e.g., Grether and Plott, l 979). 
In the present paper, we vary the response mode in both nonmarket and market contexts. The nonmarket 
pricing task is implemented with the BDM mechanism. The market pricing task is the second price sealed bid 
auction. The nonmarket choice task is choosing the most preferred item from each of three pairs: ( P  bet, $ bet}, 
( P  bet, $X}, and {$bet, $X}, where SX is between the subjects' sales prices in a preceding pricing task. The market 
choice task is implemented with the English clock auction. In this auction, the price clock starts at the amount of 
the win state payoff in a bet and then decreases by five cents every second. Each subject must decide whether to 
choose to play the bet by exiting from the auction at the price showing on the clock or to remain in the auction. 
The last subject remaining in the auction receives the a1nount of 1noney on the price clock when the next-to-the-last 
subject chooses the bet. All of the other subjects play the bet. 
We have given several reasons why anoinalous results of individual choice experiments may not be robust 
to markets. Thus if we are to understand the imp! ications of the preference reversal phenomenon for markets we 
need to test for it in market settings. Furthermore, to test the implications of the response mode explanation of 
preference reversals we need to identify econo1nic institutions with different response modes that can produce 
preference reversals. The experiments reported in the following sections include both market and nonmarket 
decisions and market decisions with both pricing and choice response modes. In addition, they also include repetition 
and feedback (subjects arc informed immediately or the results of their decisions) to establish if these are significant 
dctcnninants of subjects' responses. 
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II. Experimental Design
The experiments reported in this paper have been designed to address the topics discussed in the previous 
section. We adopted the method of pairwise choice used by Tversky, ct al. (1990), but in our experiments the 
amount $X was determined separately for each subject in order to ensure that it was between the stated certainty 
equivalents and therefore that all the data would be usable. We were able to do this because all subjects made their 
decisions at computer terminals and SX was set equal to the midpoint between the certainty equivalents (rounded 
to the nearest multiple of five cents). The subjects were not informed of the procedure for calculating $X. Certainty 
equivalents were obtained in three different ways: the BDM mechanism, a sealed bid second price auction, and an 
English clock auction. We implemented the BDM procedure in the usual way. Subjects were given the right to 
play a gamble and asked to state their minimum selling prices. A random offer price was generated and those 
subjects with reservation prices below the offer price sold the gamble and the others retained their rights to play the 
gamble. In the sealed bid auction, subjects were given the right to play a gamble and were asked to submit bids 
giving the lowest price they would accept to give up the right to the gamble. The experimenter would buy the 
gamble from the lowest bidder at the second lowest price. During the clock auction, a box on the subject's screen 
displayed an amount of money which decreased by five cents every second. Subjects could choose to leave the 
auction if they preferred the right Lo play the gamble to Lhe amount of money on the clock or they could choose to 
remain in the auction. The lasL person to leave the auction sold the right to play the gamble at the amount of money 
on the clock when the nexL to last person opLed out of the auction by choosing to play the gamble. Whenever a 
subject chose to leave the clock aucLion, the other subjects were informed with both auditory ("beep beep") and 
visual signals and the number rcn1aining v..1as displayed. Note that, while both auctions arc market mechanisms, the 
response mode in the clock auction consists of choices whereas the response mode in the sealed bid auction consists 
of stating prices. 
After each decision \Vas rnadc, the gainblcs \Vere played and subjects' earnings recorded on their computer 
screens and their cumulative earnings updated and clisplayccl on their screens. Three payment schedules were 
employed: full payment; payment equal to one half the total earnings; and payment of $10 independent of decisions 
and outcomes of the gambles. 
Common practice in auction cxperi1ncnts is to run several periods with the sarne para1neters to allow the 
prices to converge to equilibrium. We wished to conlCmn to practice, but also wanted the conditions to be as nearly 
as possible the same across experiinental sessions, so we repeated each auction five titnes. The BDM mechanism 
was not repeated in our basic design, though we did run four sessions in which it also was repeated five times. Our 
reason for treating the market and BDM 1nechanisn1s differently was that we wished to i1nplen1ent each of them in 
a way similar to that co1n1nonly found in the literature. 
In each experimental session, subjects were prcscnLcd with two pairs of gambles, each consisting of one P 
bet and one$ bet. These gambles were used by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and by most researchers since. 
Certainty equivalents for one or the pairs were obuiined using the BDM mechanism and for the other pair an auction 
mechanism was used. Varying the order of the auction and BDM n1cchanism, the two bet pairs and the auctions 
provides a basic 2 X 2 X 2 design. Applying the three payment schedules yields 24 cells . After completing the 24 
cell design we added four sessions (switching the bet pairs and the order of presenwtion) using repeated BDM and 
sealed bid auctions. 
The bet pairs used in this study \vere the rollowing: 
P bet 1: 35 chances to win $4.00; 
$ bet 1: 11 chances to win S 16.00; 
P bet 2: 29 chances to win S2.00; 
S bet 2: 7 chances LO \Vin S9.00; 
1 chance to lose $1.00; 
25 chances to lose S 1.50: 
7 chances to lose Sl.00; 
29 chances to iosc S0.50; 
5
expectation S3.86 
expectation S3.85 
expectation $1.42 
expectauon Sl .35 
Notice that for bet pair 1 the bad outcome from the S bet is worse than that from the P bet while the 
opposite is true for bet pair 2. Thus one pair satisfies the conditions of Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991) while 
the other does not. 
III. Procedures 
All experiments were conducted in the Economic Science Laboratory al the University of Arizona. The 
subjects, all of whom were students at the University of Arizona, participated in groups of five. Each subject was 
seated at a separate computer terminal on which the instructions were displayed. Subjects could page through the 
instructions at their own paces. Decision problcrns, outcon1cs, and subjects' accutnulated earnings were all displayed 
on computer screens. 
Random outcomes were determined by drawing balls from bingo cages. Subjects were asked to inspect the 
balls. Subjects could observe the balls being placed in the cages, the draws, and the outcomes. Random prices for 
the BDM mcchanis1n were generated by three dn1\VS (wilh replacement) fro1n a cage with ten balls numbered 0 
through 9. Outcomes of gambles, all of which had probabilities stated in 36 ths, were determined by drawing from 
another bingo cage loaded with 36 balls numbered 1 through 36. 
After each decision, the rando1n outco1nc was observed, the a1nounts of inoney won or lost were determined, 
and the results displayed on the subjects' computer screens. No money was actually paid until the end of the 
sessions, but subjects kne\v the results of their decisions, including accurnulatcd earnings, as the experiment 
proceeded. 
Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment. Those subjects in sessions with full payment were 
simply paid their total earnings and nothing was said about it. Before subjects entered the laboratory for sessions 
with fifty percent payment or with the fixed SlO payment, written notices were placed on the tables beside their 
keyboards. For those receiving hair the amount won, the notice st.lled: "The actual amount of money you will 
receive fro1n today's experi1ncnt vvill be one half of the an1ount of 111oney displayed on your computer screen." 
SubjecL� whose pay1ncnt did not depend upon their decisions were given the notice: "Your total pay1nent for 
participating in this cxpcriincnt \Viii be $10. You will not be paid the an1ounts that appear on your computer screen. 
However, you are asked to make the same decisions that you would make if you were going to win or lose the 
amounts of money that appear on your computer screen." After the subjects had finished the instructions on their 
computer screens, they were asked whether they had read the payment notice. When they all indicated they had read 
the notice, the experiment began. The experimenter did not read the notice aloud to the subjects, nor make any
reference to it other than asking if the subjects had read it. This procedure was intended to minimize the possibility 
of unintended com1nunication or lhc ccono1nist cxpcri1nentcr's expectation that the payoff rate might affect behavior. 
IV. Results 
In addition to the 2 8  cells in our design, \VC ran five sessions the data fro1n which are not included in the 
analysis to follow. The first and second atle1npts to run a clock auction 1,vere terminated by software failure. The 
third clock auction was completed, but the clock always started at $4.10, substantially below the maximum payoffs 
for the$ bets. Two other sessions with BDM and the scaled bid auction were also discarded. These were the first 
and second sessions without monetary incentives. At the end of the second session, two of the five subjects seemed 
surprised that they did not receive the amounLs shown on their computer screens and one of them seemed quite angry 
about it. In both sessions, subjects \Vere given 1,vritten notices stating: "You will be paid $10 for participation in this 
experiment. However, in 1naking your decisions you arc asked to pretend that you 1,vill win or lose the amounts of 
money that appear on your computer screen." They had been asked whether they had read the notice before the 
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experiments began. Apparently, two of the subjects interpreted the notice to mean that they would receive $10 extra. 
We discarded the data fro1n these t\vO sessions, and reworded the notice to the one stated earlier. 
A. Pre}Crence Reversals 
Table I reports the number of predicted reversals (PR) and the number of unpredicted reversals (UR) for 
28 experimental sessions. Proportionate rates of occurence (Rate) arc reported for both PR and UR. Table I also 
reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) or the reversals in nominal values for each payment schedule. 
Summary statistics for the prices are given in 
Table 2. 
Consider the first repetition results for the BDM mechanism (BDMJ) in Table 1. Observe that the basic 
preference reversal phenomenon has been replicated. Subjects with full financial incentives (CR!) and with 50 
percent financial incentives (CR.5) together made 100 choices between P bets and $ bets which resulted in 35 
predicted and 4 unpredicted reversals. More subjects chose the P bets (57 Lo 43), but even allowing for this the rate 
of predicted reversals is much higher than the rate of unpredicted reversals (61 percent to 9 percent). The results 
arc substantially the same for the subjects who were paid a fixed fee (CRO). Of their 40 choices, 17 resulted in 
preference reversals of which 15 were of the predicted type. Overall, the reversal rate with the BDM mechanism 
was just under 61 percent for those choosing the P bets anti about ten percent for choices of S bets. As stated earlier, 
in four sessions the BDM mechanism was repeated five times for both gambles in the pair. The results are reported 
under BDM 5 in Table 1. If we compare the preference (which was always obt.1incd after the last BDM repetition) 
with the ordering of the fifth BDM prices, we find a subsUtnLially lower rate of reversals (4 predicted and no 
unpredicted reversals out of 20 choices) but the number or cases is small. The proportion of subjects that chose the 
P bet, and the rates of predicted and unpredicted reversals, were roughly the same for the two pairs of bets. This 
suggests that the argument presented by Loomcs, Starmer ancl Sugden (1991) is not the source of the reversals in 
these experiments because only one or Lhc pairs satisfies Lhc condilions ror their argu1nent to apply. 
Not only arc predicted reversals frequent, but they involve significant a1nounts of money. Consider the Mean 
column for BDMl in Table 1. Reversals for subjecLs being paid full value averaged $2.24 and the corresponding 
amounts for subjects receiving half earnings or a flat fee were S2.5 l and $2.20 respectively. Unpredicted reversals 
were not only less frequent but of smaller magnitude as well. The overall mean unpredicted reversal was $0.74 with 
the mean being smaller than the n1can of the predicted reversals for each group, though the san1plc sizes are small. 
Mean bids were above the expected values for both of the S bets and generally quite close to the expected 
values for the P bets. The overall mean for P bet 2 was within two cents of the expected value. Not surprisingly, 
the distributions of the bids for the P bets were more concentrated than tl1ose for the $ bets. 
Turning to the scaled bid auction, we sec a sirnilar pattern of results. Consider the SPA 1 results in Table 
l .  Comparing the subjects' choices wi1h their first swtcd prices (the first and sixth of the ten prices obtained) we 
find that, for the subjects paid salient rewards, 27 of the 36 choices of the P bets resulted in preference reversals 
while only 2 of the 24 choices of the S bets did so. Subjects paid a fixed fee made 4 reversals of each type (of 11 
choices of the P bets and 9 of the S bets). Now consider the SPAS results in Table 1. Comparing the choices with 
the fifth prices, the number of reversals drops and the rates or the two types of reversals are nearly the same for the 
subjects with financial incentives (10 out of 36 P bet choices aml 8 of the 24 S bet choices). The subjects without 
financial incentives co1n1nitted only three reversals, all of the unpredicted type. 
The distributions of the bids show results which arc similar to those obwincd with the BDM mechanism. 
Bids for the $ bets tend to be above the expected values while the bids for P bet 1 are on average below the expected 
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value, and bids for P bet 2 arc on average quite close to the expected value. One difference that does emerge is that 
in the sealed bid auctions the subjects without financial incentives had the lowest average bids on all four gambles. 
The third institution studied, Ll1e English clock auction yielded results which seem to illustrate the effects 
of financial incentives. The results arc also suggestive of institutional differences between this mechanism and the 
other two but at this time we cannot 1nake a definitive state1ncnt on this issue as there simply are not enough data. 
Consider the ECAI results in Table 1. Looking at first prices for subjects with monetary incentives, we find 18 
reversals from the 29 choices of the P bets and 8 reversals from 11 choices of the $ bets. The number of predicted 
reversal drops to 9 if we use the fifth set of prices while the number of unpredicted reversals is nearly constant 
(dropping from 8 to 7). Subjects without financial incentives behaved differently. Of the 14 choices of the P bets, 
the number of preference reversals based upon the first prices is 13 and Ll1is number drops only to 10 if we consider 
the final prices. There was one unpredicted reversal of the 6 choices of the $ bet. Note that, for the $ bets, the 
bids are substantially higher (and significant.ly so) for the group without incentives ( S5.65 and $8.12 compared with 
$2.38 and $5.44 respectively). Reversals tell Ll1c same story, the mean predicted reversal being $6.73 for the no 
monetary incentive group compared with 54.44 for the other group (first prices). Consider the ECAS rcsulrn in 
Table 1. The corresponding J"igurcs for fifth prices arc S5.67 and $3.95, though sample sizes arc small. 
If one considers how the clock auction proceeds, the effects of financial incentives seem intuitive. In the 
clock auction, the higher the bid the sooner the subject drops out and the less time and effort spent watching the 
computer screen. This is especially the case for the S bets with their high win state payoffs and thus high starting 
clock prices. In all cases the clock is started at the 1naxi1nun1 payoff; subjects can spend less time watching the 
computer screen by pressing the key for choosing the bet and dropping out early. When no money was at stake it 
appears that this is what soinc of thcin did. 
Restricting attention to the subjects \vith financial incentives reported in Table 1 ,  note that subjects in the 
clock auction had higher rates of unpredicted reversals than subjects in the other institutions. With both sets of 
prices, the reversal rates \Vere higher with the clock auction and the asyn1n1ctry between the predicted and 
unpredicted rates docs not appear. Indeed, for the clock auction the reversal rate is higher for subjects choosing 
the S bet. Given the small sample sizes we do not wish to push this point too far but it appears that, as 
hypothesized, the task in the clock auction is to the subjects more of a choice task than a pricing task. 
The discussion of the clock auctions shows the danger of comparing institutions without the use of monetary 
incentives. The conclusions that one would be tempted to draw comparing the sealed bid and clock auctions are 
opposites depending upon whether one uses daU! from experiments with or without salient monetary payoffs. The 
incentives in these experiments were not trivial. Payments to subjects paid the full amount averaged 558.82, with 
the lowest being Sl9.50 and the highest being $109. Those on the fifty percent schedule in experiments without 
repetition of BDM earned an average of $35.72, with individual subject payments ranging from $18.50 to $63.75. 
Subjects in the 50 percent payoff rate cxpcrirncnts with repetition of BDM earned, on average, $56.42, with a range
from $38.25 to S96.50. The experirnents lasted between I and I 1/2 hours, including the instruction period.
From the daU! shown in Tables 1 and 2 wc conclude that the preference reversal phenomenon has been 
replicated. We also conclude that preference reversals occur. in non-repetitive 1narket environments. In repetitive 
market environments the rate of preference reversals is 1nuch lower and the asym1netry disappears. There is some 
preliminary indication that choice-based institutions n1ay not exhibit the phenomenon. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the mean bids for each bet by repetition for subjects with financial incentives. Figures
3 and 4 contain the same information for subjects paid a fixed fee. For the latter group, Figures 3 and 4 confirm
the finding from Table 2. For all four bets the average bids in the clock auction by subjects paid a fixed fee are
higher than those obtained in the second price auction for each repetition. In addition there is no evident trend in 
most of the series. The sole exception is the second price auction series for S bet 2 which has a significant negative
trend, but as the reader can ::;cc this is due only to the chop bctv.1een the fifst and second repetitions. Oniy one
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repetition of the BDM mechanism was performed by subjects paid a fixed fee and the mean bid was below the mean 
for the clock auction on the first repetition for all four gambles. The P bet findings are similar for the bids by 
subjects with financial incentives recorded in Figure 1. For the bids on the $ bets shown in Figure 2, there is
evidence of a downward trend in prices with the two auction mechanisms. There is no trend in the BDM mechanism 
bids. The downward trends in Figure 2 are swtistically significant for the second price auctions but not for the other 
mechanisms. 
Turning to the reversal or intransitivity rate fron1 pair wise choice, we basically replicate the results of 
Tversky et al. (1990). Of the 200 sets of choices made by subjects with financial incentives, 21 of them resulted 
in intransitivities. The rate of intransitivity was somewhat higher (13 out of 80) for subjects without financial
incentives but the difference is not statistically significant. We conclude that, in our experiments with individually 
chosen$ X a1nounts, we have replicated the Tvcrsky, ct al. result of approxin1atcly ten percent intransitivity and that 
the result is independent of tl1e monetary payment schedule. 
B. Determinants of' Choices and Prices 
Table 3 gives the results or Jogit estimation or two equations explaining the choice of the safer versus the
riskier alternative. The set of gambles used in the experimcms is not very rich so one should be careful nor to over 
interpret the results. All choices were either between a P bet and a $ bet or between one gamble and a fixed 
amount of money. Thus relatively small sets of variables can describe these alternatives equally well. We have 
estimated separate equations for each pay1ncnl schedule, for the subjects with financial incentives and for all subjects. 
The reader can thus judge from the log likelihood statistics whether the equations are the same for the different 
groups. Both equations include consLant tcnns (gcncnilly insignificant except for the group without incentives for 
which it is negative implying a preference for risk), cumulative winnings (never significant) and a dummy for when 
the safer bet is a P bet (insignificant ). Since the saf'cr bet was either a P bet or a cerwinty, this is equivalent to 
dummying the sure things. One equation includes the expected values of the two gambles and the other contains 
their difference. In the unconstrained equations, both variables arc statistically significant with coefficients that are 
of approximately the same magnitude and of opposite sign. The sum of the two coefficients is not significantly 
different from zero for the group with financial incentives but the hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level 
(though not at the one percent level) for those without monetary incentives. For these subjects and for the gambles 
we used it appears that a rnodcl assuining that the subjects choose between ga1nbles by co1nparing expected values 
does a reasonable job or explaining the data. 
The results or fitting swtistical moclcls to the bids are shown in Table 4 and 5. The models are estimated
separately for each payment schedule, for the positive conversion rate groups and for all the data combined. The 
two basic models estimated arc a static 1nodcl and a dyna1nic adjust1nent 1nodcl. For the static model, it is assumed 
that subjects determine their bids basecl upon the characteristics of the lottery being sold, their cumulative earning 
in the experi1ncnt, and the institutions. The variables included are a constant tcnn, the expected value of the lottery, 
cumulative earnings, a binary variable for the clock auction, and a binary indicator for the second price auction. As 
bids were submitted for only four gambles, they can be described well by a small number of variables and other such 
sets may fit the data \veil. For an alternative specification, the expected value was split into ilo;.; positive and negative 
terms and both parts entered as explanatory variables . 
We add three nevv explanatory variables to the dyna1nic adjustinent n1odel: the previous value of the bid, the 
previous market price, and the a1nount won on the prior repetition of the task. The idea is that, to the extent that 
the variables introduced into the static 1noclcl arc incorporated in the previous bid, the new information available
consists of the market price and the subjects ' experience \Vith this task. V./e expect all three variables to be
significant with positive coefficients. 
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In implementing the clock auction, subjects were informed when a participant dropped out and told how 
many remained. This means, as noted before, that the last person to drop out knows that he or she will sell the 
gamble and knows the price. Thus the last (lowest) price may not be a meaningful number. In the least squares 
regressions we si1nply used those prices assu1ning thcn1 to be correct. To delete them could cause biases as we 
would be deleting the smallest prices in certain groups of five, thus sampling on the dependent variable. Strictly 
speaking, all we know about the prices in question is that they arc less than the next-to-the-lowest prices. 
In the Tobit model some observations are completely observed, and for some observations the explanatory 
variables arc observed while the dependent variable is below sonic generally unknown threshold. The situation we 
have here is similar to that for which the Tobit model is appropriate but in our case the thresholds are known and 
vary across observations. The equations in Table 4 were rcesti1nated by maximu1n likelihood using a generalization 
of the Tobit model which allows the thresholds to vary. The results are shown in Table 5. The estimated 
coefficients for the clock auction dummy variables are all lower in Table 5 than in Table 4. The estimated 
coefficients and I-ratios for the other variables arc nearly identical in the two tables; hence we shall discuss only the 
results in Table 4. The similarity is not surprising as the number of observations affected (one fifth of the clock 
auction observations) is a s1nall fraction or the total. 
As only the static inodcl is available on the first repetition, we fit it to data for repetition one, repetitions 
two through five, and to all repetitions to allow for tests or stability. The resulLs me sensible and consistent with 
the estimates on choices discussed previously. The coefficient of the P bet variable is significant and negative. The
coefficient of the expected value is highly significant, positive and takes on sensible values (around .86 to .9). The 
cumulative winnings variable is never significant. The institutional dun1n1ies are generally insignificant for the first 
repetition, and significantly negative for subsequent repetitions, suggesting that after the first repetition the bids from 
both auctions are lower, ceteris paribus, than those fron1 the BDM n1echanism. This is in agreement with 
impressions from Figures 1 through 4. The striking exception is that the clock auction coefficient is significantly 
positive and large (on the order of S2 to S3) for all repetitions for subjects without financial incentives. The 
hypothesis that it is the expected value or the ga1nble, rather than its positive and negative parts, that influences bids 
is not rejected. 
The dynamic adjusunent 1nodcl is cstiinatcd using all data fro1n the second through the fifth repetition and 
for subjects on the fifty percent payment schedule we rcestimatcd the model using data on the two auctions only. 
Auction market prices provide information about other bids, but BDM "prices" are simply the result of random draws 
fro1n a bingo cage. For the BDJ\1 n1cchanis1n, the price 1nay provide infonnation about the randomizing device, but 
it provides no infonnation about the value of the gainbtc, thus v.1e v.1ould expect the lagged price variable to be more 
significant when only the auction data arc used. 
The results for the dynamic adjustment model shown in the last two to four columns of each panel for Tables 
4 and 5 arc encouraging and in agrcc1nent \Vith our expectations. The coefficients of the three lagged variables are 
positive and generally significant (the exception is for the fifty percent group). Furthermore, dropping the BDM 
observations (for the fifty percent payment and combined fifty percent and one hundred percent groups) increases 
the magnitude of the coefficients and l ratios for the lagged 1narket price. Including the lagged dependent variable 
reduces the magnitudes and t-ratios for the variables included in the static n1odcl, which makes sense as their 
influence should be largely incorporated in the previous bid. The significance of the lagged 1narket price variable 
is especially noteworthy as this indicates that subjects do alter their bids based upon the market price which carries 
information about the bids of other market participants. This suggests that the extra information available in market 
as opposed to individual choice cxpcrirnents is used by the subjc-cts, which could account for some of the typical 
differences between results fro1n the l\VO types of experin1cnts. In no case was the cumulative earnings variable close 
to being statistically or econo1nically significant, indicating that the i1111nediate crediting of winnings to subjects may 
not yield significant wealth elfocts, but the significance of the lagged win variable (the amount won or lost on the 
previous repetition of the task) suggests that subjects clo respond to J'ccdback (and possibly repetition). 
10
In summary, the story fro11  the regressions is that subjects in our experiments based Lheir bids upon the 
expected values, taking into account previous market prices (in auctions), and adjusted their bids down for P bets. 
On average, subjects bid rnore with the BDI\11nechanis1n, except those without 1nonetary incentives \vho bid most 
when participating in the clock auction. V-/c note that the explanatory variables account for about 20 to 40 percent 
of the variance, so the individual characteristics, learning patterns and other un1neasured factors account for the 
majority of the variation in the bids. We reiterate that with only four two-outco1nc ga1nbles it is possible to explain 
the variation in them with a small number of variables so that one should be careful in interpreting our results or 
in extending them to other contexts. 
\1• Sumn1ary and Conclusions
In our experiments we have observed the preference reversal pheno1nenon in a 111arkct setting (second price 
auction) with im1nediate feedback, both \Vith and without financial incentives. 
After five repetitions or the Huction, subjects' bids 1Nerc in general consistent with their choices and the 
asymmetry between the rate of predicted and unpredicted reversals had virtually disappeared. The pairs of gambles 
used were a subset of those originally used by Lichtenstein and Slavic (1971). The same subjects also provided 
valuations elicited by the Wtditional BDM mechanism (without repetition). Their responses replicated the usual 
findings: those who chose the P bets committed preference reversals about sixty percent of the time while those who 
chose the $ bets committed reversals al a ten percent rate. A subset (20) of the subjects participated in five 
repetitions of the BDM mechanism: the rates of predicted and unpredicted reversals after the fifth repetition were 
0.4 and 0.0 respectively, \Vhich suggests th8t the pheno1nenon n1ay persist at a lower rate but the sample size is so 
small that we reserve judgement on this. Our subjects replicate the preference reversal phenomenon on the first 
repetition of the BDM procedure and the first repetition or the second price auction. \Vith repetition, however, the 
preference reversal rate \VHS substantially \o\vcr. 
Previous researchers (e.g. Bostic, 1-lcrrnstcin, and Luce 1990; Tvcrsky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990) have 
focused on the response mode. In addition to the BDM and second price auctions in which subjects provide 
numerical valuations of garnbles, we cn1ployed two choice-based 1ncthocls, one in the individual decision making 
setting and one in a market environ1nent. Taking X to be the 1nidpoint between subjects valuations for the S bet and 
P bet (rounded to the nearest multiple of five cents) subjects were asked their choices from [$bet, $X}, {P bet, $X)
and {P bet, S bet}. Our results replicale those of Tvcrsky et al. and Bostic ct al.) as we observe rates of intransitive 
choice (approximately ten percent) n1uch lower than the observed rate of preference reversals. Values obtained 
using the clock auction, a choice-based institution, produced fewer total reversals and roughly equal numbers of 
predicted and unpredicted reversals. 
We have observed prcrcrcnce reversals \vith 1narkeL institutions in cxperi1nents with every decision being 
acted on immediately using one of three different payment schedules (full payment, half payment, and a fixed 
payment independent of the outcomes of subjects' decisions). Thus we arc inclined to rule out feedback and 
incentives alone as causes of discrepancies bct\vccn the results or 1narket and individual choice experiments. With 
repetition, the rate of preference reversals fell substantially with all methods and the asymmetry between rates of 
predicted and unpredicted reversals generally disappeared. This suggests that the repetitive nature of the tasks in 
market experiments in conjunction \Vith feedback is an i1npon.ant factor. 
We cannot rule out the possibility that 1narkct and individual decision 1naking environments present 
psychologically different k1sks which could lead to qualitatively different behavior. However, merely being in a 
market \Vas not sufficient to lo\ver the rate of reversals. Subjects in our experi1nents see1ned to be influenced by 
the past values of market. prices. 1lius \Ve conclude that the extra infonnation generated in 1narkets is used by 
market participants and could provide a partial explanation ror the apparent connict bet\vcen 1narket experiments and 
individual choice experin1cnts. 
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Our experience with the notice inrorn1ing subjects that their rev.1ards v.1ould not be based upon their decisions 
points out the difficulty in studying incentive effects. SubjccL'> in our cxpcri1ncnts were undergraduates at the 
University of Arizona and all sessions took place in the Econo1nic Science Laboratory there. It is possible that the 
expectation that their earnings would depend upon their performance was so strong that some subjects actually 
believed this to be the case in spite of receiving notice to the contrary. We did not observe any evidence of this with 
the second (revised) notice and from the results with the clock auction do not believe it was a problem. However, 
we did not anticipate a problc1n with the first notice though there clearly \Vas one. 
The effect of financial incentives was dramatically illustrated by the results of the clock auction. Our
conclusions about preference reversals and repetition in 1narket institutions arc reversed with and without monetary 
incentives. In other respects, we do not sec striking results of varying the payment schedule. We followed the 
method of Cox and Epstein (1989) in playing out each decision as it was made and updating subjects' earnings 
during the expcri1nents and found no cffecl of cun1ulativc earnings on subjccL)' behavior. 
The results presented in this paper support the view that the nature of market institutions and the information 
generated by the 1narkets, together \viLh feedback and the repetitive nature of 1narket tasks, account for the generally 
positive results of 1narkct expcri1ncnts. The BD!'v'l 1nethod and the first repetition of the second price auctions 
produce comparable pref'crcncc reversal results, but by the fifth repetition of the auction mechanism we no longer 
observe the preference reversal phenomenon. 
In our first attc1npt al. understanding the apparent discrepancies between results fro1n market and individual 
experiments, we have perfonncd both types of cxperiincnts as they are traditionally presented in the literature. Thus 
we have presented subjects with the s�une tasks in both 1narket and non-n1arket environments and observed the 
outcomes. While we have identified several factors that often differ between the two types of experi1nental settings 
(information, repetition, feedback, psychological selling, incenlives, and institutions) we leave the identification of 
the separate effects of these factors for future \Vork. Indeed our results suggest that several of the factors combined 
rather than any one of thern arc r0quirccl to account for the clillcrcnccs between the two classes of experiments. 
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P R  Rate 
CR! 1 1  .458 
CR.5 24 .727 
Total 35 .614 
CRO 1 5  .600 
Total 50 .610 
CR! ].] .733 
CR.5 1 6  .762 
Total 27 . 750 
CRO 4 .364 
Total 31 .660 
CRl 7 .467 
CR.5 1 1  . 786 
Total 18  .621 
CRO 13 .929 
Total 31 .721 
TABLE 1 
Frequencies of Outcon1es of Choices 
Means and Standard Deviations of Revers:\ls 
11ean UR Rate f'dean PR Rate 
BDMl 
2.24 I .0625 .50 
(1.59) 
2.51 3 . 1 1 1  .50 4 .400 
( 1 .81 )  ( ..1 .1)
2A3 4 .093 .50 4 .400 
( 1 .73) ( .37)  
2.20 2 .133 1.23 
( 1 .67) ( .39) 
2.36 6 .!03 .74 4 .400 
(!.70)  ( .50) 
SPJ-\1 
2.84 IJ .000 •1 .267 
(2 .29)  
3 .72 2 .105 .60 6 .286 
( 3 .16)  I .12) 
3.36 2 .083 .60 10 .278 
( 2 .82)  I .42) 
2 .5'1 4 .114..i Ll-1 () .000 
( I .IC) ( .47) 
:J .26 6 .182 1 . 10  10 .213 
(2 .70 )  ( .57) 
EC Al 
6.0] 4 .800 ,;)4 (j .400 
I •l .21)  ( . :l8) 
3.45 4 .667 .70 3 .214 
(4.67) ( . .  15 I
•l .44 8 .727 .51 9 .310 
(4.56) ( . 39)
6.7.3 1 .167 2.20 10 .714 
(3 . S:l) 
s.,10 9 .529 . 71 19 .<!,12 
(4.25) ( .67)  
]\ey: (;l{J COJIVersion rate = 1.0 
CR.5 con\'ersion ra1.e = 0.5 
CllO conYersion rate = 0.0 
P-H. = pn::dicted reversal 
UR = unpredict.ed reversal 
l\rlean UR 
BDM5 
3.49 0 
(2.37) 
3.49 0 
(2.37) 
3.49 0 
(2.37) 
S PA.5 
3.25 I 
(2 .86)  
2.27 7 
( l .4:l) 
2.66 8 
(2.03) 
;] 
2.66 1 1  
(2.03) 
ECA5 
3.50 3 
(2 .20) 
4.85 4 
(5.82) 
3.95 7 
(3A6) 
5.67 l 
(3 .81) 
4.86 8 
( :J.65) 
Rate 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.200 
.368 
.333 
.333 
.333 
.600 
.667 
.636 
.167 
.471 
13D1'1; = Becker-DeGroot-1'1arshak repetition i i=l,5 
SPA.; = second price auction repetition i i=l,5 
ECAi = English Clock ,-\net.ion repetition i i=l,5 
Figures in parentheses a.re st.a.udard dcYiations 
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Mean 
2.40 
1.69 
( .15) 
1.78 
(1.27) 
1.47 
( l .08) 
1.70 
(1 . 17)  
.78 
( .4 7) 
.92 
(1 .23) 
.86 
( .92) 
.95 
.88 
( .85) 
I-' "' 
TABLE 2 
Mea11s and Sta11dard Deviatio11s of Bids by I11stit11tio11 a11d Payoff 
7 chances $9.00 
29 chan<'es $-.50 
N J\1l ean St.cl . l_)evia.t.ion
CRJ 50 :us �.57 
CR.5 100 Hi6 2 .81  
CRO 50 1 .48 1.72 
CRJ &. 5 150 :3 .57 2.n
All 200 :J.04 2.67 
CR! 50 2.00 2 .5 1  
CR.5 50 2.76 2.34 
CRO 50 5.65 2 .18  
CR! & 5 1 00 2.38 2.48 
All J50 3.47 2.84 
CR! 20 3.43 2.40 
(�R.5 70 :J.60 2.:37 
CRO 20 2.42 2.09 
CR! & 5 90 3.56 2.38 
All 1 1 0  :J .36 2 . :35 
Key: CR! conversion rate = 1 .00 
Cll.5 conversion rate = .50 
CRO conversion rate = 0.0 
N 
50 
1 00 
50 
150 
200 
50 
50 
50 
J OO 
150 
20 
70 
20 
90 
1 1 0  
2 9  chances $2.00 lJ chances $16.00 
7 chances S-- 1 .00 25 chances $-1.50 
!VT ea.n St.cl. J)evia.tion N I\1ean Std. Deviation 
Second Price .A.uctiou
1 .51  .44 50 4 . 18  4.33 
1 .  72 .28 100 4 .16  2.95 
1 .02 .72 50 2.02 1.50 
l .G5 .:35 J 50 4 . 16  :J.46 
J .49 .51 200 :J.62 3.22 
JDnglish (�lock 1\ u ct.ion
l.5fi .29 50 6 .25 4.44 
1 .76 .20 50 4.64 3.96 
1 .67 .:J2 50 8 .12  5.68 
1.66 .26 J OO 5.44 4.26 
1 .67 .28 150 6.:34 4.93 
Becker-DeGroot-:rvlarshak 
1 .4 5  .47 20 3.94 1.61 
1 .37 .G9 70 6.44 4.22 
1.49 .45 20 5.55 4.02 
1.39 .65 90 5.88 3.93 
1.40 GI 110 5.82 3.93 
35 chances $4.00 
l chance $-1. 00 
N Mean Std. Devi ation 
50 3.02 1.21 
100 :J .48 .U5 
50 3.06 1 .28 
J.50 3.:33 1 .08 
200 3.25 1 . 14  
50  3.97 .09 
50 3.79 .32 
50 3.82 .29 
100 3.88 .26 
150 3.86 .27 
20 :J.52 .65 
70 3.53 1 . 0 1  
20 3.23 1 . 1 1  
90 3.53 .94 
1 10  3.47 .97 
TABLE 3 
Maxin1u111 Likclil1ood Logit Estin:iates 
Conversion Rate 1 .0 0.5 0.0 1 .0 & 0.5
Variable
constant -.28 . 1 3  . 19 .10 - 1 . 1:3  -.49 -.0:3 .08 
(0.7) (0.6) (0.6) (0 .6) (2.9) (2. l ) ( 0 . 1 )  (0 6 )  
expects .89 .72 .68 .79 
(5A) (5.6) ( 5 . 1 )  (7.7) 
expectr -.74 -.76 -.44 -.75 
(4.2) (5 .2) (2.8) ( 6. 7 )  
Slllll\Vin - .OJ  - .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
( 1 .  3) ( 1 .4 )  (0.5) (0 .5 ) ( 1 . 1 )  ( 1 . 0) (0.2) (0.2) 
pbets .32 . 31  .21  .2 1  . 14 . 15  .00 .00 
(1 .5)  ( 1 .5)  ( 1 .2 )  ( J.2) (0 .6 )  (0 .7)  (0 . 1 )  (0.0)  
di  ff .84 . 7:J .63 .78 
( 5 3 )  (5 .8 )  (5.0) (7.8) 
n 400 400 600 600 400 400 1000 1000 
-ln L 25,1 . 2  25!).1 :J84.!J 384 . !)  253.4 255.() 642 .5 642.7 
% correct 63.:J 
%Dependent 
\1 ariable = 1 52.8 
Dependent variable = 
expects 
expertr 
pbets :::::: 
d i  ff
SUl11YVll11 
c•) -� 
) .:,, , •J 59.8 60.0 GS.O 62.8 59.9 58.6 
52 .8 54.8 511.8 46 .3  46.3 54.0 54.0 
Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
l if chose ga.rnhle \Vi th greatest chance of \Vinning
0 other1vise 
expected value of less risky gan1hle 
expected value of rnore risky garnble 
l if safer ga.n1ble is a pbet 
expects - expectr 
cu1r1ulat.ive 'vinnings through previous round 
1 5
All data
- .33 -.08 
(1. 7) (0.7)
.75 
(9 .2) 
- .65 
(7.2) 
.00 .00 
(0.5) (0.4) 
.04 .04 
(0.3) (0.3) 
.73 
(9.2) 
1400 1400 
901 .5 902.8 
64.9 62.9 
5 1 .8 51 .8 
Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Coefficients Dependent Variable is B, d
Conversion R,ate 1 .0 
Repetition 1st 1st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 
Variable 
Constant 1.67 1 .49 1 .63 1.54 1 .32 1.27 l.04 1.24 
(2 .8 )  (2 .0)  (4.1 ) (3 .2)  (.3.:3) (2 .4 )  (:3 .2) (3. 1 )
\V .88 .83 .81 .01 
( l . 7 )  (7.(i )  (CLO) (.01 ) 
A9 .G:3 .72 .4.S 
( . 5 )  ( 1 . 0  I ( .9)  ( .8) 
w+l .9 1 .84 .82 -.0:3 
( 5 . 7 )  (9 . 1 ) ( 7 . 2 )  ( .2) 
p bet -2.(Jl -J .77 - 1 .42 - l. : 3 1  - 1 . 1:3 - 1.07  - .57 - .S:l 
( S . 2 )  ( 2 .5 )  ( 6.2) ( :1.1 I ( 4 .0 )  ( 2 . 1 )  ( 2.4) ( 2. 1 )  
SUlll\Vill .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
( .2 )  ( .2) ( .5 ) ( . 1 I ( .5 ) ( .5) ( . J )  ( . 1 )  
I-" l-'Ca .79 . 19 .:38 . :is . .  54 .54 - . 18  - . 18 
"' ( 1 . 7  I ( LG )  ( 1.:3) ( 1 . 1 )  ( 1 .9 I ( 1 .9 )  ( . 8 )  ( . 8 ) 
spa .74 .74 -.05 - .06 
(Ui) ( l .G ) ( . 2 )  ( .2 ) 
lag bid .38 .:38 
( (i.9) ( G.9) 
lag price .41 .41 
( 4 . 1 )  ( 4 . 1 )  
lag win . 15  . 14 
(3 .7 )  (3.G) 
ll 160 l (j() 480 480 320 :320 :320 :320 
R2 .29 .29 .21 .21 .18 . 1 8  .53 .53 
R2 .27 .26 .20 .20 . 1 7  . 17  .51 .51 
SSR 933 .7  9:32 .8  2989.0 2988.3 1990.:3 1990.2 1 1.55.8 1 153.3 
Figures in parentheses are t ratios. 
I<ey: 
al 
pw 
w 
1
sum \Vin 
lag win 
lag price 
phet 
spa 
eca. 
lag bid 
amount if lose (in clotlarsJ 
amount if win (in dollars J 
the nun1her of chances to 1vin 
aw · pw/36 
al(l-pw)/36 
cun1ulative 1vinnings throngh prc·vious round 
a.n1ount 1von on prevjous repetition of this task 
n1arket price on previous repetition of thjs task 
1 if gamble is a pbet., 0 otherwise 
1 if second price a.uctio111 0 other\vise 
1 if English clock auction, 0 othenvise
amount bid on previous repetitim1 of this task 
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Table 4 (cont'd) 
Conversion Rate 0.5 
Repetition 1st 1st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-.Sth 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
auctions only 
Constant 2.82 2.62 2.72 2.98 2.67 3.10 .58 .83 .43 .82 
( 6 . 1 )  ( 4 .4)  ( 10 .6)  (9.4) (8.4) ( 8 . 1 )  (2. l )  ( 2.5) ( 1 .9)  (2 .7)  
w .78 .76 .75 .23 .2:3
( 5.4 ) ( J () .:3 )  ( :S.8) ( 3 .7 ) (2.9) 
.36 J. :30 1 .65 .71  .9.5
( . 'I ) ( 3 .0 ) ( :l.3) ( 2 . 1 )  (2.:3 )  
w+l .82 . 1 1  .Gfi . 1 8  . 1 5  
(G .5 ) ( 1 1 . l ) (9 .J )  p.:3 ) ( 2.2) 
plie\ -2.GO -2.25 - l .G.5 - UJ8 - 1  .:33 - 1 .89 - .06 - . :3() - .05 -.49 
(8 .2 )  ( 'LO )  ( l(J.5) ( 6 .9) ( 7 .4 ) ( 5 .7 )  ( .5 )  ( l .6)  ( .4) I 1 .8)  
SUJll\Vlll .00 .oo .00 .00 .00 .oo .00 .00 .00 .00 
( . I ) ( . l) ( . 1 )  ( .2) ( . 1  ) ( .  l )  ( .5 ) ( .5)  ( .9 )  ( .8) 
f-' eca .02 .02 - .50 -.50 - .G:l - .6c[ - .25 - .27 .07 .08 
00 .0  . 0  ( 2.:l ) ( 2.:3) ( 2 . 1)  I 2.4 l ( 1.2) ( 1 .2)  ( .5 )  ( .5) 
spa. . 11  . 11 - . -1.K - .48 - .64 - .6.5 -.:3:3 - . :34 
( .3)  ( . :3 )  ( 2 .7 )  ( 2.7 )  ( 2.8) (2 .9 )  ( L7J ( 1 .8 )  
lag bjd .72 .72 . .SS .. 58 
( 27.0) ( 27.0) I 16.:3) ( 16.4) 
lag price - .02 - .0:3 . 1 1  .07 
( .5) I .G) ( 1 . 5 )  ( . 9 )  
lag \1,,'in . 0 1  . 0 1  . 0 1  . 0 1  
( . 5 )  ( .6)  ( .5) ( .6) 
n 240 240 880 880 640 640 640 640 480 480 
R2 .:l2 .:32 .22 .22 . 1 9  . 19 .6:3 .63 .50 .50 
-2R .:30 .30 .21 .21 . 1 8  . 1 8  .63 .63 .49 .49 
SSR 1:311 .8 1 :3 10 .l  4728.7 4718.4 3307. 7 :J287.0 1499 .G 1493.7 1 146.5 1 1 37.4 
Table 4 (cont'd) 
Conversion R.ate 1 . 0  and 0.5 
Repetition ls\ 1st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
auctions only 
Variable 
Constant 2. :3:3 2. 14 2.:37 2 .-50 2.50 2.77 .57  .82 .. 52 .79 
( (j. I ) (4 .6 )  ( 11 .0 )  ( 9.4) ( 8 .6)  ( 8.0 )  ( 2 . 2 )  ( 2.8) (2.8) (3.4) 
\V .82 .78 . 77 .23 . 1 .5  
( 7 .2 ) ( 1 2 .8 )  ( 1() . 7 )  ( 3.9) (2.3) 
.4 1 1 .06 Ll3 .74 . 71 
( .(j)  ( 2.D ) ( :U)  ( 2.4) ( 2 . l) 
w + l  .8G .IG . 71 . 1 7  .09 
( 8 . 7 )  ( 14.4) ( 1 1.G ) ( :) .5 ) ( 1 .6 )  
p be\ -2.:3 ]  -2 .06 - 1 .!)7 - J  .7.J - J.27 - UH - . J 7 - .49 - .20 -.54 
(9 .(i ) ( A .7 ) ( 1 2 . l  ) ( Ll ) ( 8 .3 ) ( S .8 ) ( J..j ) (2.4) ( 1.5 ) ( 2 .  l) 
S U  !ll\VIU .oo .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
>-' ( . 2 )  ( .2 )  ( . 3 )  ( .:3 )  ( .2 )  ( .2 )  ( . :3 )  ( .2)  ( .  7) ( .6)  
<.D 
eca. .:35 .:J.5 - . 2 1 - .24 - .5:2 - .:3:3 - .07 - .08 .06 .06 
( J .  l ) ( 1 . 1  J ( 1 .4)  ( I  .4) I 2.2) (2 .2 ) ( . I ) ( .4 ) ( .5) ( .5) 
spa .:36 .:36 - A l  -Al - . /.j - . 14 - .20 - .20 
( Ll )  ( 1.: 3 )  ( 2 . 6 )  ( 2.6 )  ( :}.;3) p.:3) ( 1 . 0 )  ( LO) 
lag bid .(i.j .64 .50 .50 
(26 .J )  ( 26.:3 )  ( 16.3) (lG.4) 
!a.g price .03 .02 .25 .24 
( . 7 )  ( . 6 )  ( 4.4) ( 4.2) 
lag win .0-1 .04 .04 .04 
( 2A ) ( 2.5) (2. 7) ( 2.7) 
n 400 400 1360 1:360 960 960 960 960 800 800 
R2 .30 .30 .21 .21 . 18 . 18 .56 .56 .49 .50 
R2 .29 .29 .20 .20 . 18  18  . .56 .56 .49 .49 
SSR 2270.9 2268.2 7769.0 7764.9 5322.0 5309.9 2835.4 2825.l 2382.9 2373.0 
Table 4 (cont'd) 
Conversion lla.te 0.0 
Repetition 1st lst All All 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
Constant 2 . 1 8  l .6cJ 2 . 17  2.34 .65 1 . 18  .00 .19 
( :3 . 3 )  (2 . 1  I ( 5. 1 ) (4.6) ( 1 .5 ) (2.2) ( .1) ( .4) 
\'-,.' .77 .80 .81 .31  
p.9 ) ( 7 .2) ( G .O I (2 .4)  
- .-J:J L . 17 2 .01  .65 
( .4 I ( 1. 8) ( 2. 5 )  ( .9) 
w+l .89 . l i .70 .27 
( 5 . 2 )  U-i . OJ ( G .O )  ( 2 .5) 
pbet -2 .41 - Ui8 - 1 .9 1  - :2. 1 :3 - 1.64 -2.:l8 - .57 - .18 
(5.9 J ( 2 .2 ) ( s . 1  I ( l .  'l ) (!'i .  7) ( ! ..5  I (2 .2) ( 1 .6) 
Sll]!)\ViJl - . 0 1  - .0 1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
( _(j) ( .G I ( . j ) ( .-1)  ( ·'' )  ( .iii ) ( .4 )  ( .5) 
cca 2.15 2 . V i  Ui5 1.().5 2.94 2.9-1 1 . 12  1 . 15  
"' ( 4 .3  J ( -U )  ( cJ .k J ( 1 .8) ( J0 .2 )  ( 1 () .: 3 )  ( 3 .1) ( 3 .8) 
0 - .72 - . 7:3 - l.27 - 1 .21 spa. 
( 1 . 4 ) ( J A) ( :J.7) ( :J . 7 )  
lag bid .4 7 .48 
( 8.6) (8.6) 
lag price .22 . 19
(2 .2) ( 1 .8) 
lag win .00 .00 
( .0 )  ( .0) 
ll l00 liiO 480 480 320 320 320 320 
R2 .:37 . :38 .:35 .35 .:J.5 .36 .56 . . 56 
R2 .:35 .:36 . :34 .34 .:3.5 .:35 .5.5 .54 
SSR 1 029.8 1020.6 :3163 . l  :31 60.5 2077.3 2059.0 1430.3 1429.0 
Table 4 ( cont'd)
(�onversion Rate All Data 
Repetition 1st 1st All All 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
auctions only 
Variable 
Constant 2.25 l.9.5 2. :31 2A6 2.49 2.82 .40 .66 .:34 .55 
( 7 .0 )  ( cj .8) ( J J. 7) I I 0.2) I 8.7 )  ( 8.G) ( 1. 6 )  (2 .3)  (2.1) (2 .6)  
\V .81 . 19 .78 .2:3 . 1 7  
( 8 . 1 ) ( H.:3) ( j l.9 ) (4 .4 )  (2 .8 )  
. 19 L. 1 0 1. 19  .75 .60 
I .:3 l I 3.4 l I :J.9 J (2 .6)  ( 1 .9 )  
w +l .81 .rn . 1· 1 . 18  . 12  
I Hl.1 l I Hl. J J I 1 2.G J ( 3 .9 ) (2 .3 )  
pbct -2.:Jl - 1 .96 - 1 .66 - 1 .85 - 1.:37 - 1 .80 - .2 1 - .. 54 - . 2.5 -.52 
( 1 1.1 ) ( 5. l ) ( L l.2 )  I 8 .ff) ( 9 .9 ) ( / .  l ) (2. l ) ( 2 .8 ) ( 2 .2) ( 2.5) 
�t L l l l \\:Jn .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
N ( 0 .  J )  ( o .  J ) ( . 6 )  ( . G )  I . I ) ( . / ) I .G )  ( .G )  I . 9 )  ( .9 )  f--' eca .94 .94 .:3:3 .:J3 .00 .00 .22 .21  .:32 .33 
I :3 .5 J ( :l .5 )  ( 2 . 1 ) I 2 .  l l ( .o ) ( . 0 )  ( 1 . 1 )  ( 1. 1 )  (2 .  7) (2 .7 )  
spa. . 1 1  . Jl -.65 6 '  - .  ') - l .02 - l .02 - 1 .5 - . 1 6  
( .5) ( .5 )  ( 4 .4 )  ( 4.4) ( l . 5 )  I ·l.5 l ( . 7 )  ( .8) 
lag bid .62 .62 .50 .51 
( 27.2) ( 27.:3) I 18.8) ( 18 .9)  
lag price .08 .08 .27 .26 
(2 .:3 ) ( 2 . 1 )  (5 .6 )  (5 .2)  
I a.g win .02 .02 .03 .0:3 
( 1 . 7 )  ( 1 .7 )  ( 2 . 1 )  ( 2. 1 )  
n 560 560 1840 1 840 1280 1280 1280 1280 1 120 1 120 
R2 .:3o .:30 .22 .22 .20 .20 .. 55 .55 .51 .51 
R 
R2 .29 .29 .22 .22 . 19  . 19  . . 55 .55 .51 . . 5 1  
SSR 3424.9 3416.2 11488.7 1 1481.9 7826.4 7800.5 4:355.0 4341 .9  3881.0 3872.8 
Key: 
al amount if lose (in dollars ) 
a.w amount if win ( i n  dollars ) 
p\V the nun1ber of cha.nces to \Vin 
w aw · pw/36 
a.l( l-pw )j:3G
SUlll \Vin 
lag win 
la.g price 
pbet 
spa 
eca 
= cun1ulative \vinn·ings through previous round 
a.n1ount \Von on previous repetition of this task 
n1arket price on previous repetition of this task 
1 if gamble is a p liet, 0 otherwise
1 if second price auction , 0 other\vise
1 if Engl i s h  clock auction. () otherwise
lag bid a.1nonnt hid on prcvions repetition of t h i s  task 
2 2
Table .5 Maximum Likelihood Estimates Tobit Model with Varying Cutoffs Dependent Variable is Bid 
Con version Rate 1.0 
Repetition 1st 1st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
Variable 
Constant l .  73 J..59 1. 71 1 .64 L.38 1 .36 1 .03 1 .23 
( 2.9) ( 2 . l) ( 4 . 1 )  (3.3) (:l.3) (2 .5)  ( 3 .0)  (2.8) 
\V .86 .8 1  .79 - .01 
I l.G )  ( Ll )  ( 5 .5 ) ( .  l ) 
.5G .GS .75 . . cj;3 
( . 5 )  ( l.O )  ( .9 )  ( . 7 )  
w+I .89 .82 .79 - .05 
( 5 . D )  ( SA )  ( G . 5 )  ( .4 ) 
plwl -2 .0:l - I .Sci - l .'16 - L38 - l. l!i - 1. J:l - .57 - .8:J 
( S .2 )  ( 2. G )  ( (i. 0 )  ( :i . I ) ( :l.9 ) ( 2 . l )  ( 2.:l) ( 2.0 )  
S l l  !ll\Vlll .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
( . 2 )  ( .2 )  ( .±)  ( A ) ( .5 ) ( .5) ( .0)  ( . 1 )  
N cc a .47 .-1 7 . 0 1  w .Oc3 .22 .n - .42 - .42  
( 1 .0) ( 1 . 0 )  ( .  l )  ( . 1  ) ( . 7 )  ( . 7 )  ( L7) ( 1 . 7 )  
spa .14 .74 - .07 - .07 
( 1.6) ( l .G )  ( .2 )  ( .2 )  
lag bid .40 .40 
(7 .OJ ( 7. 0 )  
lag price AO .40 
( 3.8) ( :3.9) 
Ja.g \Vill . 15 . 14 
(3.6) (:.J .5) 
11 1()0 lGO 480 ·180 :320 :320 :320 320 
0-2 6.09 6.09 6.76 G .76 6.90 6.90 4.02 4.01 
- la.g L :360.53 360.48 1080.65 1080.63 7 14.89 714.89 635.15 634.86 
Figures in parentheses are t ratios. 
Table .5 ( cont'd )
Conversion Rate 0 .. 5 
Repetition lst l st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 
auctions only 
Variable 
Constant 2 .86 2.65 2 . 7 1  2.C)8 2 .63 3 .07 .52 .79 .42 .80 
( (). j ) ( ·1.5) ( J() .;J) ( 9. J )  ( 8 .0 )  ( 1 . 8 )  ( J . 8  J ( 2.4 )  ( l.8) (2 .6 )  
\V .77 .77 .7G .2:3 .2:3
( :) . :,)) ( J(J .0 )  ( 8 . 7 )  ( :l .6) (2 .8)  
.:J4 I .:J:l J .69 .74 .94 
( .·l ) ( :J. O )  ( :J .:J) ( 2 . 1 )  (2 .2)  
w+I .82 . / ] . (j 7 . 18 .15 
( ().:} ) ( 10.D) ( B.D) ( :J .2) (2 . 1 ) 
plwt -2 .5-5 -2 .28 - 1. 70 -2 .01 - [ . :38 - l.95 - .07 - .39 -.05 -.48 
( 8. :3 )  ( 1.0 )  ( 10.5 ) ( 6.9 )  ( 7 .4 ) (f:i. 7 )  ( .) ) ( l .6 )  ( .:J) ( 1 .7 )  
"-' S l l l ll\Vil l .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .... 
( . 2 )  ( .2) ( . 1)  ( .2 )  ( .2 )  ( . J ) ( . G )  ( ,(j) ( .9) ( .8 )  
(�Ca. - .20 - .21  - .  7:) . ,- . 1  .) - .88 -.88 - .4] - .42 - . 11 - . 1 1  
( .5) ( .5) ( :J . :l )  ( :J .3) ( 3 .  J ) ( 3 .2) ( 1 .9) ( l.9 )  ( . 7 )  ( . 7 )
spa . ]  2 . 12  - . .J(j - .46 - ,(j 1 - . G l  - . :Jo - .31  
( .4 ) ( .4) ( 2 . .S )  ( 2.5) ( 2 . G )  (2 .6 )  ( l.5) ( J.6) 
lag bid .73 . 7:3 .59 .59 
(26 0/ )  ( 26 .7 )  ( 16 .2)  ( 1G .3)  
Ja.g price -.02 -.0:3 . 10  .07 
( . . 5) ( .6)  ( 1 .4 )  ( .8)  
lag win .01 .01 .01 .01 
( .4)  ( .5)  ( .4) ( .6) 
n 240 240 880 880 640 640 640 640 480 480 
(j2 5.65 5 .6-5 5.67 5.65 -5.49 5.46 2.47 2.46 2.54 2.52 
- lag L 5:38.03 5:l7.87 195:l.04 1952.08 1405 . 19  1403.21 1 160.65 1 159.35 872.37 870.66 
Table 5 ( cont'd) 
Con version Rate 1.0 and 0.5 
Repetition I st lst All All 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 
auctions only 
Variable 
C'.onst.a.nt 2.38 2 . 1 9 2 .39 2 .54 2.49 2.78 -5'.J .79 .51 .78 
( (H )  I I .  I )  ( 10 . 7 ) ( 9 .2 )  ( 8 .2 )  ( 7 . 7 )  ( 2 . 0 )  (2.6) (2.G) (:l. J  ) 
\\! .8 1 . 78 . / , .22 . 14  
I I . o  J ( J 2.2) I l0 .2 ) (3 .7)  ( 2 . 1 )  
. 12 ].(JC) l.:37 .76 .70 
( .G )  ( 2 .9 ) I :u J I 2.4)  ( 1.9)  
w+I .8:) . (.) . 7  l . I 7 .09 
I ·" .5 ) I Ll.8) ( l l.0 )  I :3:2 ) ( lA )  
pbcl -2.:35 - 2 . l 1 - I .62 - l.81 - 1. :3 1  - 1 .G:S - . 17 - .51  - .20 - .5 1
( 9. G )  ( 1 . 1 )  I 12 . 0 )  ( 7 .:J ) ( 8 . 2 )  ( 5 . 1 )  ( l .  I ) ( 2.:l) ( 1 .4)  ( 2.2) 
"' Sllltl\O,'j 1 1 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
U1 ( .2 )  ( .2 )  ( .3 ) ( . :J) ( .2 )  ( .2 ) ( A )  ( .3)  ( . 7 )  ( .G) 
eca .08 .08 - . :)2 - .!52 - .79 .79 -.27 - .27 - . 15  - . 15  
( .2 ) ( . :J) ( 2.8) (2 .8 )  I :J . 1  ) ( 3. 2 )  ( L3) ( 1 .3)  ( 1 . 1 )  I 1 . 1 )
spa .:l7 .:37 · .·HJ - . 10 - .7 1 - . 7 1 - .  1 8  - . 18  
( Ll ) ( 1.:3) (2 . 'I ) ( 2A )  ( :J . J) ( 3. l )  ( . 9 )  ( .9) 
lag bid .65 .65 . .s l .:)1 
( 25 .8) (25.9) ( 16 .2)  ( I 6 .2 )  
lag price .02 .02 .24 .23 
( .5)  ( .5) ( 4 . 1 )  ( :J .9)
lag \Vilt .04 .04 .04 .04 
( 2.2) (2.3) (2 .5) (2 .5) 
11 400 400 1:360 1360 960 960 960 960 800 800 
&2 5.89 5.89 6.08 6.08 ,,_97 5.95 :3 .17 3 . 16  3 .2:3 :3.21  
- lag L 900.81 900.60 3039. 75 :JO:J9.32 2124.43 2123.28 1836.51 1834.79 1529.49 1 528.01 
Table 5 ( cont'd) 
(�onversion Ua.te 0.0 
Repetition !st lst All All 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
Variable 
Consta11t 2.22 l.66 2 . 11 2.2:3 .48 .97 - . 15 - .06 
( :J . J )  (2. l ) ( 4 .7 )  ( l .2 )  ( LO )  ( ].  7)  ( . 4 )  ( . 1 )  
\\: . f;J )�() .81 .29 
( :Ls I ( 6. 7 )  ( 5 . G )  ( 2 .0J 
· . 1 8 1 . 07 1 .9 1 .48 
( . I ) ( l .5 ) ( 2 .2 )  ( .G )  
" + I .81 . i I .71 .27 
( '> . 1  I ( 7 . G )  ( 5 . G )  ( 2 .2) 
p lie\, -2.]8 - J .G2 - l.1'8 -2 .0· 1 - I.GO -2.21 - .47 - . (j() 
( 5.8 )  ( 2 . l  I ( 7 .:; ) ( I .  I I ( 5 . J  I I ,1.0  I ( l. 7 )  ( 1 .2) 
Sll tll\\1111 - .OJ - .o J .00 .00 .01 .0 1 .oo .00 
N ( . 7 ) ( .8)  ( . :J )  ( .:J )  ( . 7 )  ( .0)  ( . (j ) ( . 7 )  
"' ('Ca. l.9:l I .<J:3 i . :rn I .:JS 2.70 2 .71 .8.5 .87 
( :J .8 ) ( :l.8 ) ( :l.8 ) ( '.J .8) ( 8 .6 ) ( 8 . 7 )  ( 2 .6 )  ( 2 .6 )  
spa - .7 J - . 7 1  - L30 - LlO 
( t ..i I ( l. l )  I :3 .6) ( :l . 6 )  
la.g bid .5 1  .51  
( 8 . 7 )  (8. 6 ) 
la.g price .21 . 19 
( 1 .9 )  ( 1 .  7 )  
lag win .00 .00 
( . 0 )  ( . 0 )  
11 160 160 480 .mo :320 :J20 ;320 :320 
a2 6.77 6.71 7 .:39 7.:39 7.53 7.47 5 .10 5 .10 
- lag L :369.96 '.369.24 1095.72 1095.63 721 .29 720.31 664.99 664.95 
Table .5 (cont'd)
(�onv(_�rsion ll.ate All Data 
Repetition 1st 1st All All 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 2nd-.5th 2nd-5th 2nd-5th 
auctions only 
Variable 
C'.011 :st.ant 2 .29 2 .00 2.:31 2 .. J5 2 .-1 'l 2 .77 .32 SI .28 .4 7 
( 7 . 0 ) ( 1 . 9 )  (1 1.2 )  ( 9 . 7 )  ( S .  I I (S.O) ( 1 .2 I ( 1 .9 ) ( l .6) ( 2.  J ) 
\\' .so .79 .78 .2:3 . 15 
( 7 . 8 )  ( I  :J .G) ( 1 1 . :n ( 4 .0) (2 . J )  
. rn 1 . 09 l . " l8 .72 ' ".. ) .) 
( .:l ) ( :J .2 )  ( : J .  7) ( 2 . 4 )  ( LG) 
w+l .8G . IG . 7 1  . J S . 1 1
( 9.7 ) ( I 'd ) ( 1 2 . 0 )  ( :J , (j )  ( 2 . 0 )  
pbct -2.:\'j - I .  98 - 1. GS - 1 .81 - I .  :is - I .82 -.L! - .52 - . 2;3 - . •17 
( 1 1. 0 )  ( 0 .0 )  ( l :l . I ) ( 8 .:l)  ( 'l. I ) ( (i . 8 )  ( Ul ) ( 2 .5 )  ( 1 .8 )  ( 2.1) 
N :-ill l ll \V i ll .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
-J ( .0 )  ( .0 ) ( ,(j) ( .6)  ( .8 )  ( .8 ) ( .8 )  ( .8) ( 1 .0 )  ( 1 .0 )  
eca .67 .G9 .05 .05 - . 27 - . n .02 .OJ  .09 .10 
(2.4) ( 2 . 1 )  ( . :J ) ( .:J) ( l.l ) ( 1 . 1 ) ( . 1 )  ( . 0 )  ( .  7) ( . 8 )  
spa .12 .12 6'- . ;) - .65 - 1 .00 -LOO - . 12  - . 14  
( .5 )  ( .s )  ( 1 . 2 )  ( 4 .2) ( 1 . 2 )  ( 4 .2 )  ( .G )  ( .  7 )  
lag bid .6:3 .6:3 .52 . :):J
(26 .8) (26.9) ( 18 .G )  ( 18. 7)  
lag price 0.8 .07 .26 .25 
( 2 . 1 )  ( L9 )  ( 5 . 1 )  ( 4.8) 
lag \Vj li  .02 .02 .0:3 .03 
( 1. 5 )  ( L.5 )  ( 1 .9) ( 1 .9) 
11 560 .560 1 840 1840 1280 1280 1280 1280 1 120 
[r2 6.:37 6 .36 6 .74 6.74 6 .71  6.69 3.70 :3.69 :3.81 
- lag L 1281.45 1280.79 4181 .86 4181.:37 2882.36 2880.51 2.526.04 2524.42 2214.68 
CR=0.5 &1 .0 pbet1 
Mean bid by repetition 
rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 reps 
00 eca pbet1 E±:l spa pbet1 f++I bdm pbet1 I • .. J E(X) pbet1 
CR=0.5 &1 .0 pbet2 
Mean bid by repetition 
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rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 reps 
00 eca pbet2 E±:l spa pbet2 l > I bdm pbet2 EJ E(X) pbet2 
Figure 1 .
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CR=0.5 &1 .0 $bet1 
Mean bid by repetition 
8 . .,, .... .. .. .. .. .. .  ,,, ,,,, . .... .. ... .. � . .,,�·· ·  .. . . .. � ........ ,,,_,,,, , . . ..... . . . .. .... ... .... .. . 
s ��, -" �. ""--
�--+�����..+-����--+������ 
,_ .•• 
/ "  
s t--�"�·::::-�====::==::::::::����-t�___:""'::--
rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 
00 eca $bet1 � spa $bet1 F+·l bdm $bet1 I ' I E(X) $bet1 
CR=0.5 &1 .0 $bet2 
Mean bid by 
- 1  • ,-- · ··"'
�··
"''"
· t°
�
-. 
"
·'
"
·
·-
,.,
,._, 
__ _ 
repi rep2 rep3 rep4 
00 eca $bet2 E<frJ spa $bet2 l + 'l bdm $bet2 f I E(X) $bet2 
Figure 2 .
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reps 
reps 
CR=O.O pbet1 
Mean bid by repetition 
4 _™ _ _
_ 
™, _
____
____
_ ,r ___ ' - - - - ,------.r ____ _  , _ __ I= - , 
'' . . • 
rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 · rep5 
00 eca pbet1 EE spa pbet1 H+j bdm pbet1 D E(X) pbet1 
CR=O.O pbet2 
Mean bid by repetition 
2 - ... 
+--- ---+� 
� 
--4 
�-----
- j 
0 
' 
rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 reps 
00 eca pbet2 EE spa pbet2 f w l  bdm pbet2 [] E(X) pbet2 
Figure 3 .
3 0
CR=O.O $bet1 
Mean bid by repetition 
1 0  "' 
8 
6 
4
rep1 
� 
.... 
� 
. ..... 
"' 
rep2 rep3 rep4 
00 eca $bet1 8B spa $bet1 D bdm $bet1 I ml E(X) $bet1 
CR=O.O $bet2 
Mean bid by repetition 
7 -.----------- - - -
6 � � 
� 
5 
4
·,, 
'"-
'� ,, 
'·.._ , 
3
2
' -
0 
rep1 rep2 rep3 rep4 
00 eca $bet2 8B spa $bet2 I <H bdm $bet2 D E(X) $bet2 
Figure 4 .
3 1
• 
rep5 
! ' 
• 
. .. .. 
; ' 
rep5 
14 
FOOTNOTES 
*Department of Econon1ics, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, and Division of the Humanities and Social
Sciences, California Institute of Teclmology, Pasadena, CA 9 1 125, respectively. We are grateful for financial support 
from the National Science Foundation (grant no. SES-8820552) and the California Institute of Technology. Research 
facilities were provided by the Economic Science Laboratory at the University of Arizona. Valuable computer 
programming was provided by Sean Comes and Shawn LaMaslcr. We thank Professor Jeffrey Dubin for his help 
in setting up the software for the generalized Tobit model, and Professors Joyce Berg and Graham Loomes, and 
Charles R. Plott for helpful comments. 
1 .  The Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) procedure works as follows. A subject states the minimum price at which 
he would sell his right to play a lottery. A buying price is then drawn from some probability distribution. If the 
buying price exceeds the stated selling price, the subject sells his right to play the lottery at the buying price. If the 
buying price is less than the selling price-, the- subject plays the lottery. 
2. In addition, sorne types of individual choice cxpcri111cnts have generally produced results that are consistent with
theory. For example, finite horizon sequential search n1oclc!s have predicted subject decisions reasonably well 
(Braunstein and Scholler, 1 98 1 ,  1 982; Cox and Oaxaca, 1 989, i 992a, 1 992b). 
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